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Abstract
In this paper we offer a novel type of network model which can capture the precise
structure of a financial market based, for example, on empirical findings. With the
attached stochastic framework it is further possible to study how an arbitrary
network structure and its expected counterparty credit risk are analytically related
to each other. This allows us, for the first time, to model the precise structure of an
arbitrary financial market and to derive the corresponding expected exposure in a
closed-form expression. It further enables us to draw implications for the study of
systemic risk. We apply the powerful theory of characteristic functions and Hilbert
transforms. The latter concept is used to express the characteristic function (c.f.)
of the random variable (r.v.) max(Y,0) in terms of the c.f. of the r.v. Y . The
present paper applies this concept for the first time in mathematical finance. We
then characterise Eulerian digraphs as distinguished exposure structures and show
that considering the precise network structures is crucial for the study of systemic
risk. The introduced network model is then applied to study the features of an over-
the-counter and a centrally cleared market. We also give a more general answer
to the question of whether it is more advantageous for the overall counterparty
credit risk to clear via a central counterparty or classically bilateral between the
two involved counterparties. We then show that the exact market structure is a
crucial factor in answering the raised question.
Keywords – Counterparty credit risk, systemic risk, network structure, network model,
analytic function, digraph, graph, Eulerian, characteristic function, Hilbert transform, analytic
signal, bilateral & multilateral netting, advantageousness of a central counterparty.
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1 Introduction
One risk type that has gained particular attention in recent years, largely due to the credit
and financial crisis that started in 2007, is counterparty credit risk. On the one hand, over-the-
counter (OTC) markets have been seen to respond heavily to financial distress. On the other
hand, centrally cleared markets continued to trade without major disruptions even at the height
of the financial crisis1. Following the impact of this crisis, the G20 countries therefore decided
to thoroughly revamp the OTC derivatives market in 2009 in order to reduce the immanent
systemic risk. In Europe the reforms are implemented through the so-called European Market
Infrastructure Regulation2 (EMIR). The US equivalent is called the Dodd-Frank Act3. At the
core of both new regulations is the obligation of the market participants to clear their stand-
ard OTC derivatives through a central counterparty (CCP). Non-centrally cleared contracts
should be subject to higher capital requirements. These measures are designed to compre-
hensively change the market structure. Today, many classes of derivatives are already being
cleared through CCPs, for example, LCH.Clearnet4 clears interest rate swaps, and ICE Clear5
or CME6 clear credit default swaps.
Several authors such as Nier et al. [Nie+07], Moussa [Mou11], Rosenthal [Ros01] or Gai
et al. [GK10] emphasise the importance of the precise market structure in the context of study-
ing counterparty credit risk and therefore systemic risk. Furthermore, empirical studies have
shown that network structures in different countries are quite varied.7 Despite these facts, most
previous models in the context of counterparty or systemic risk have assumed a simplistic net-
work structure8 such as complete or star graphs. Duffie & Zhu [DZ11] or Cont & Kokholm
[CK14], for instance, assume a complete graph. These simplistic network structures, however,
are not able to capture empirical findings such as [UW04] or as in chapter 4 in [Mou11] and
tend to over- or underestimate the overall risk.
In section 2 we present a network model, which is capable of capturing the precise structure
of any given financial market based, for example, on empirical findings. We further introduce
a stochastic framework to study how different network structures and counterparty credit risk
are analytically connected to each other. This allows us, for the first time, to model the precise
structure of an arbitrary financial market and to derive the corresponding expected exposure
in a closed-form expression. We take the perspective of a regulator and are mainly interested
in the overall risk of a market for a typical day in the future. In a first step, we incorporate
position uncertainty in size and direction in one single distribution. Our model is then capable
of dealing with an arbitrary graph as well as accounting for a wide range of distributions that
represent a position between two counterparts. In a second step, we use conditional probab-
ilities in order to extend this approach to arbitrary digraphs, where the size and the direction
of all positions can be determined independently. That is, the distribution that represents the
1See, for instance, [Ros01] or [Ban09].
2See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:201:0001:0059:EN:PDF.
3See http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ203/pdf/PLAW-111publ203.pdf.
4http://www.lchclearnet.com/
5https://www.theice.com/
6http://www.cmegroup.com/
7A comprehensive overview of these studies and the used network models is provided by [FL13] and
[Mou11].
8See section 1.3.1 in [Mou11] for an overview.
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position value and therefore the exposure can be chosen independently from the exact structure
and thus perfectly adapts to the individual circumstances of a given network. To this end,
the model only assumes that each non-zero position is distributed identically by an arbitrary
symmetrical distribution with an existing mean. We have not incorporated correlations, as sug-
gested by Cont and Kokholm [CK14], because we use the powerful theory of characteristic
functions (see Lukacs [Luk70]) for analysing sums of independent random variables. By using
this theory, we deduce how we can analytically capture the process of netting in regards to the
associated random variables (r.v.s). Afterwards, we show how to determine the expected credit
exposure of a netted position by using the so-called Hilbert transform (see King [Kin09a]).
For that purpose, we use expressions for the c.f. of the random variable max(Y,0) in terms
of the c.f. of the r.v. Y based on results of Pinelis [Pin13]. The present paper applies this
concept for the first time in mathematical finance. Nevertheless, Hilbert transform methods
have been used before in mathematical finance, for instance, by Feng and Linetsky [FL08]
to price discretly-monitored single- and double-barrier options in Levy process-based models.
An overview of Fourier transform methods in finance can be found in [Che+10].
In section 5 we provide auxiliary results which can be used for the application of the network
model. In the first subsection we prove Proposition 5.1, which contains two very useful formu-
las about Hilbert transforms, by using the residue theorem. These formulas are particularly
useful for calculating the Hilbert transform of intricate functions. We also study the so-called
positive and negative absolute values of a distribution in section 5.2. Both types are used to
represent the direction of a position. The term ’analytic signal’, known from the field of signal
processing, is then introduced, and we show in Proposition 5.3 that the positive absolute value
of a distribution is an analytic signal. Some of these insights are used in section 3 to prove
both structure theorems 3.2 and 3.3. The theorems basically state that Eulerian digraphs are
distinguished exposure structures and that digraphs possess different characteristics compared
to graphs in the context of counterparty credit risk. We further reveal that different structures
within graphs or digraphs can have a significantly different impact on the overall counterparty
risk.
We then apply our network model and its stochastic framework in section 4 to study the
features of bilateral and multilateral clearing and to give a more general answer to the question
raised by Duffie & Zhu [DZ11], of whether it is more advantageous for the overall counterparty
risk to clear via a CCP or classically bilateral between the two involved counterparties. The
two authors model the counterparty credit risk of each market participant and for both netting
types as an independent and standard normal distributed random variable in order to answer
this question. This web of obligations and claims, described in [DZ11], can be illustrated as a
complete graph. With the introduced network model we can answer this question not only for
complete graphs, but for arbitrary graphs and digraphs as well. Moreover, the network model
introduced in section 2 is not constrained to the normal distribution. It can also employ any
(symmetric) distribution with a defined expected value. We finally show in section 4.3 that
the question of the advantageousness of one netting type also depends heavily on the precise
structure of the market by comparing the implications of our model and the model used by
[DZ11].
3
2 Network Model for a Financial Market
Counterparty credit risk, often known just as counterparty risk or default risk, is usually defined
as the risk that the entity with whom one has entered into a financial contract will fail to fulfill
his side of the contractual obligations.9 Credit exposure or simply exposure defines the actual
loss in the event of a counterparty defaulting. In the next two subsections we explain the
basic settings for a general financial market which is subject to counterparty risk. We start
with a market modelled as a graph where size and the direction of a position is determined
by a random variable. We extend this model by using conditional probabilities in order to
determine the direction well before any observation is drawn. This allows us to model the exact
directed network structure of any financial market, where only the position size is a matter of
coincidence. Furthermore, we introduce the stochastic framework and a set of formulas to
calculate the expected credit exposure.
2.1 Market Settings
We consider a financial market M with N ∈ N participants and K ∈ N different classes of
derivatives C ∶= {1, . . . ,K}. Derivatives classes could be defined by underlying asset classes,
but we could also aggregate different underlying asset classes to one derivatives class. Let
k ∈ C and mk ∈ N. We model each financial sub-market of derivatives class k as a single graph
Gk = (V = {v1, . . . , vN}, Ek = {ek1, . . . , ekmk}). It consists of a non-empty finite set V = V (Gk)
of elements called vertices and a finite set Ek = E(Gk) of unordered pairs of distinct vertices
called edges. The vertices of a given graph Gk represent the N market participants, and the
edges of Ek stand for the trade positions or simply positions between two different counterparts
within derivatives class k ∈ C. A trade position is the net value of a bilateral portfolio within
derivatives class k ∈ C. Furthermore, a financial market M is usually endowed with a set of
market conventions, that apply to each of the N participants within a class of derivatives. For
instance, the type of netting or the day-count conventions are typical market conventions. We
write Ê ∶= ⊍k∈C Ek for the compounded set of edges10 and G ∶= (V, Ê) shall represent all graphs
Gk on the common set of vertices V . Here, ⊍ stands for the disjoint union of sets.
We assume that the uncertainty of the value of a future bilateral trade position can be rep-
resented by a real-valued probability distribution P , which is symmetric around the origin and
with zero mean. That is, we model the uncertainty of size and direction of a position of a coun-
terpart v ∈ V relative to counterpart w ∈ V ∖ {v} in derivatives class k ∈ C by a r.v. X(k)v,w ∼ P .
A realisation of the r.v. X(k)v,w is denoted by x(k)v,w ∈ R. If x(k)v,w is positive then v will claim this
amount from w, but if x(k)v,w is negative then v will owe the amount of x(k)v,w to w. The direction
as well as the associated size or weight of an edge {v,w} ∈ Ek is then defined by the observation
x
(k)
v,w of the random experiment.
The given graph Gk supplemented by the directions of each of its corresponding realisation
x
(k)
v,w represents a so-called directed graph or just digraph Dk = (V,Ak = {ak1, . . . , akmk}). Dk also
comprises the vertex set V and a set Ak ⊆ (V × V ) of ordered pairs of different vertices called
arrows, as well as two maps h ∶ A → V and t ∶ A → V assigning to every arrow a ∈ A a head
9This kind of risk arises in almost every financial market such as the derivatives market, the interbank
market, the money market, or the repo market.
10This is, for the sake of simplicity, an abuse of notation.
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vertex h(a) and a tail vertex t(a). Within a digraph we know that the creditor h(a) ∈ V claims
the position value from the debtor t(a) ∈ V for all a ∈ Ak. A digraph Dk = (V,Ak) is called an
orientation of a graph Gk = (V,Ek), if each edge {v,w} ∈ Ek is replaced by one of the ordered
pairs (v,w) or (w, v), i.e., the digraph Dk along with its realisations is an orientation of Gk.
We call a graph or digraph weighted, or network, if each link of each derivatives class k is
assigned with a real number. A realisation x(k)v,w ∈ R of the r.v. X(k)v,w also provides a weight11
for each edge of Gk. That is, the outcomes of the r.v.s X
(k)
v,w define a weighted orientation of
Gk. Analogously, we write Â ∶= ⊍k∈C Ak for the compounded set of arrows and D ∶= (V, Â) shall
represent all digraphs Dk with k ∈ C on the common set of vertices V .
If we only want to model the weights of a digraph with pre-defined directions by r.v.s, we can
use the following technique. We start over with an undirected graph Gk = (V,Ek). Each r.v.
X
(k)
v,w ∼ P shall be supplemented with a direction in form of a condition, denoted by ±, defining
whether the direction shall be positive or negative. We set
±∣X(k)v,w∣ ∶= ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
+∣X(k)v,w∣ , if (w, v) ∈ Ak−∣X(k)v,w∣ , if (v,w) ∈ Ak
and say that +∣X(k)v,w∣ = ∣X(k)v,w∣ is the positive absolute value and −∣X(k)v,w∣ the negative absolute
value of the distribution P or of the r.v. X(k)v,w. That is, we take the absolute value of the
symmetric r.v. X(k)v,w and multiply the outcome by ±1. Here, the factor +1 stands for an
incoming and −1 for an outgoing arrow of the vertex v ∈ V . The edge becomes an arrow, and
the associated distribution, denoted by ±∣X(k)v,w∣ ∼ ±∣P ∣, is not symmetric anymore. It contains
either only positive or only negative outcomes. For instance, the probability density function
f of the r.v. X(k)v,w ∼ N (0,1) and the density function f+ of its positive absolute value ∣X(k)v,w∣ is
given by
√
2
pie
−x2
2 for x > 0 and 0 otherwise. We denote the normal distribution by N (µ,σ),
where µ is the mean and σ the standard deviation. Because of the definition of ∣X(k)v,w∣, we
already know that v claims the trade position from w before any observation is drawn from∣X(k)v,w∣. If we apply this technique to all edges it allows us to study any orientation Dk of the
given graph Gk. In the following we will, for the sake of simplicity, first introduce the market
settings for directed graphs. Afterwards we adapt the notation to undirected graphs simply by
forgetting the direction of the arrows or positions.
2.2 Closeout Netting and Credit Exposure
So-called closeout netting agreements have been a common tool for reducing the credit exposure
of an entire market M. A closeout netting agreement is a legally binding contract between
two parties. It stipulates that if one counterparty defaults, legal obligations arising from de-
rivative transactions covered by the netting agreement must be based on the net value of such
transactions. We do not consider benefits of collateral and default recovery.
The applied closeout netting convention of the market M defines exactly what trades of an
arbitrary counterparty v ∈ V can be aggregated into one net position in the case of a default.
11Also called size within this document.
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Expressed in terms of set theory, this means that the applied netting convention defines a parti-
tion12Lv of all links that are incident13 to v. That is, Â(v) ∶= {a ∈ Ak ∣ v incident with a; k ∈ C}
can be decomposed into Â(v) = ⊍Λ∈Lv Λ with Λ ≠ ∅, where all trades of each set Λ ∈ Lv have
v as one of the two counterparts in common. We call Λ ∈ Lv a netting set of the market parti-
cipant v.
Obviously, a netting set is strongly dependent on the used netting opportunity as part of the
market conventions. Within an OTC market, for instance, the ISDA Master Netting Agree-
ment14 is a standard closeout netting agreement which allows two bilateral counterparts to net
across different kinds of derivatives. Although netting across all product categories is often
not allowed15, we will in the following net across all classes of derivatives of C. In contrast,
a CCP offers the possibility of netting across all its clearing members16. Bilateral as well as
multilateral netting will be treated in detail in sections 4.1 and 4.2.
Each netting set Λ ∈ Lv corresponds with a set of r.v.s XΛ ∶= {±∣Xλ∣}λ∈Λ, where each element
of a netting set represents the future value of a bilateral trade position with counterpart v. If
we want to calculate the expected counterparty risk of a set of r.v. {±∣Xλ∣}λ∈Λ of a market
participant v, we need to specify whether an arrow λ is a claim or a debt of v relative to its
counterpart. For this purpose we use the already introduced notation X(k)v,w. Further we write
Λv to stress that each trade position is meant relative to v, i.e., if the position is positive then
v claims the amount from w, and if it is negative then v owes the amount to w. We designate
XLv ∶= ⋃Λ∈Lv XΛ as the family of sets of r.v.s of v that implies the counterparty risk of the
market participant v for the entire market.
v1 v2
v3v4
a22
a11 a
2
1a
1
4
a12
a23 a
1
3
Figure 1: Digraph D = (V ∶= {v1, v2, v3, v4}, Â) with Â = {a11, a12, a13, a14, a21, a22, a23}.
For instance, an evident partition of the set Â(v1), as graphically suggested in Fig. 1 by the
different types of arrows, is Â(v1) = {a11, a13} ⊍ {a22, a23}. The netting set Λv1 = {a22, a23} of Fig.
1, for example, corresponds with the set XΛv1 = {∣X(2)v4,v1 ∣,−∣X(2)v1,v2 ∣} of random variables. The
partition Lv1 = { {a11, a13},{a22, a23} } contains all netting sets of the counterpart v1 and the
family of sets of r.v.s XLv1 of v1 reflects the uncertainty of the future value of the positions
between v1 and its counterparts.
12See [Die05], Chapter 1 for the general definition of a partition of a given set.
13The vertex v of a graph Gk is incident with an edge e ∈ Ek if v ∈ e. We further call an arrow a ∈ Ak
of the digraph Dk incident with the vertex v if h(a) = v or t(a) = v.
14See http://www2.isda.org/.
15See section 3.4.7 in [Gre10].
16See section 3.4.10 and 14.1 in [Gre10].
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The objective of this very general notation of netting is to be as flexible as possible so that
the model can cope with arbitrary netting types. In addition, we do not need to handle huge
adjacency matrices, and we can apply the introduced notation for the next definition. We say
that a digraph D is distributed by P , denoted by X ∼ ±∣P ∣, if and only if all trade positions
of XLv for all v ∈ V are distributed independently and identically (i.i.d.) by ±∣P ∣. We adapt a
similar notation X ∼ P for undirected graphs G.
After knowing the relevant netting sets and defining how to interpret the r.v.s, netting is
then simply performed by adding the estimated future position values in form of the random
variables. By taking the maximum between the netted sum and zero we determine the credit
exposure for the counterparty v and netting set Λv. Hence, the counterparty risk of v considering
the netting set Λv is determined by
max
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣ ∑λ∈Λv ±∣Xλ∣; 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ ,(2.1)
where ±∣Xλ∣ is the positive or negative absolute value of a real-valued symmetric r.v. Xλ ∼ P
with zero mean. The theory of characteristic functions is a powerful tool for analysing sums
of independent random variables. If the r.v.s of the finite sequence (Xλ)λ∈Λ are mutually
independent then the c.f. of the sum Y ∶= ∑λ∈ΛXλ is simply the product
φY = ∏
λ∈Λ ±∣φXλ ∣(2.2)
of the corresponding characteristic functions. In general the function φY is complex-valued,
that is, φY (t) = η(t) + iν(t) with real part Re(φY ) = η and imaginary part Im(φY ) = ν. Ap-
parently if we want to apply this concept to (2.1), we have to find a way to figure out the c.f.
of the positive as well as the negative absolute value of the given distribution P . We derive
formulas for this purpose in section 5.2.
If a market participant w claims money from the defaulted counterpart v, then w will probably
incur a loss. Whilst if w owes money to the defaulted counterpart v, then w will still have to
honour the contractual payments. That is, in the latter situation w cannot gain from the
default by being somehow released from their liability. Thus, only a positive trade position
implies an exposure greater than zero. The exposure can be figured out by using formula (4)
in [Pin13] in order to obtain the c.f.
φmax[Y ;0](t) = E(eitmax[Y ;0]) = 1
2
[1 + φY (t)] + i
2
[H{φY }(t) −H{φY }(0)](2.3)
of the r.v. max[Y ; 0]. Here, i is the imaginary unit and H{φY } is the Hilbert transform17 of
the (characteristic) function φY given by
H{φY (t)}(ω) ∶= 1
pi
PV ∫ ∞−∞ φY (t)dtω − t ∶= lim→0 1pi (∫ ω−−∞ φY (t)dtω − t + ∫ ∞ω+ φY (t)dtω − t )(2.4)
with t, ω ∈ R and provided this integral exists. The PV in front of the integral denotes the
Cauchy principal value18 that expands the class of functions for which the ordinary improper
17See section 3.1 in [Kin09a].
18See section 2.4 in [Kin09a].
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integral exists. When it is clear from the context what is meant we will use the variable t for the
argument of the input function as well as for the argument of its Hilbert transform. According
to Theorem 2.3.1 and its Corollary 2 in [Luk70] we can derive the expected value of any r.v. Z
by
E(Z) = i−1∂t[φZ(t)](0),(2.5)
on the condition that the first moment exists. In our case, we set Z ∶= max[Y ; 0] in order to
compute the desired expectation.
2.3 An Illustrative Example
Several authors use simplified network structures such as complete, star, or random graphs.
For instance, Duffie et al. [DZ11] or Cont et al. [CK14] assume complete graphs. Other
authors such as Nier et al. [Nie+07] assume that the edge set follows the Erdoes-Renyi model.
The present model, however, can deal with arbitrary graphs.
2.1 Example: Consider the financial marketM with four market participants in which interest
rate and FX derivatives are traded. The market is depicted in Fig. 2 with Gk = (V, Ek)
with k ∈ C ∶= {1,2} and V ∶= {v1, v2, v3, v4}. Here, the edges of E1 = {e11, e12, e13, e14} and
E2 = {e21, e22, e23} are represented by solid and dashed lines, respectively. Apparently neither
of the two graphs G1 and G2 is complete or of star form, and both are different. We further
v1 v2
v3v4
e22
e11 e
2
1e
1
4
e12
e23 e
1
3
Figure 2: Digraph D = (V, Â) and underlying graph G = (V, Ê)
assume that X ∼ L(0,1) where L(µ, b) denotes the Laplace distribution with mean µ and scaling
parameter b. The partitions
Lv1 = { {e11, e13},{e22},{e23} } Lv2 = { {e14},{e21},{e22} }Lv3 = { {e11, e12, e14},{e21} } Lv4 = { {e12, e13},{e23} }
and their elements, the netting sets, are determined by the netting type19. According to
formulas (2.2) - (2.5) the expected counterparty risk of a netting set Λ ∈ Lvi with i ∈ {1,2,3,4}
can be calculated in four steps:
(a) Determine the c.f. φY of the netted position by using formula (2.2);
(b) Calculate the Hilbert transform of φY ;
19In anticipation of section 4, multilateral and bilateral netting is applied to the edge sets E1 and E2,
respectively.
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(c) Determine the c.f. φmax(Y ;0) of the credit exposure with formula (2.3);
(d) Apply formula (2.5) to get the expected credit exposure.
Afterwards the expected credit exposures of netting sets can be summed up because of their
additivity.
We start with the c.f. φX(t) = 11+t2 of a single r.v. X ∼ L(0,1) and we chose Λ ∈ Lvi with∣Λ∣ = 1. By applying formula (2.2) and considering that X = Y we obtain φY = φX for all
seven single-element netting sets. The calculation of the Hilbert transform H{φY }(t) = t1+t2 is
straightforward20 and the c.f.
φmax[Y ;0](t) = 1
2
[1 + φY (t)] + i
2
[H{φY }(t) −H{φY }(0)] = 1
2
[1 + 1
1 + t2 ] + i2 [ t1 + t2 ]
of the credit exposure can be determined by formula (2.3). Finally, we get E(max[Y ; 0]) =
i−1∂t[φmax[Y ;0](t)](0) = 12 for the expected credit exposure of Λ by applying formula (2.5).
For the remaining three netting sets the same steps (a)-(d) need to be performed, but the
r.v. Y and the c.f. φY will be different due to the bigger netting set. The netting set Λ′ ={e11, e12, e14}, for instance, contains three edges which implies that φY (t) = φ3X(t) = 1(1+t2)3 . Thus,
H{φY }(t) = 15t8(1+t2)3 + 5t34(1+t2)3 + 3t58(1+t2)3 which leads to E(max[Y ; 0]) = 1516 . Each of the two-
element netting sets entails an additional 34 of expected counterparty risk. Adding up, we
receive 9516 = 7 × 12 + 2 × 34 + 1516 as the expected counterparty risk of the entire market.
The models of [DZ11] or [CK14] would have assumed that both graphs are complete, which
means that each participant is connected via a trade position to all others. Another huge ad-
vantage of the present network model is that it can cope with a wide range of distributions. In
the example above we have used the Laplace distribution but we could also have applied any
other symmetric distribution with existing mean.
In situations where we have additional information about the possible direction of an exposure,
it can be reasonable to model directed exposure. This means that only the position size is a
matter of coincidence. Our network model can deal with arbitrary digraphs as well by taking
the additional information in the c.f. into account. That is, for digraphs we need to calculate
the c.f. of a single random variable, for instance, according to Proposition 5.3. Afterwards
the remaining steps (b)-(d) are identical. In Example 4.1 the expected counterparty risk of a
directed simple two-tier market structure is calculated.
As long as we are capable of determining the related c.f.s and the corresponding Hilbert
transforms we can use the outlined network model and the attached stochastic framework to
determine the expected counterparty risk of an arbitrary graph or digraph. In section 5 we
present auxiliary results, how some of the hurdles can be overcome in performing steps (a)-(d).
3 Specific Network Structures and Counterparty Risk
To deduce a formula for the expected counterparty credit risk of an arbitrary network structure
and for such a wide range of possible distributions, even without considering dependencies
20Please refer to Example 4.6.
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between the different positions, is a demanding task. Let us assume that the digraph D = (V, Â)
represents a network structure and that future positions are distributed by X ∼ ±∣P ∣. The
challenge is then to compute E (max [∑λ∈Λv ±∣Xλ∣,0]) for an arbitrary netting set Λv of a
counterpart v and to deal with various of problems attached to it: The negative as well as
the positive absolute value is not distributed by P anymore, because their sample space is
restricted either to ] −∞,0[ or to ]0,∞[. The probability distribution of the sum ∑λ∈Λ ±∣Xλ∣
is actually the convolution of their distributions, and in general, little can be said about it.
Finally, taking the maximum causes some sort of asymmetry of the problem, and this implies
the non-additivity as the following example illustrates.
3.1 Example: SupposeD = (V,A = {a1, a2}) is the digraph as depicted in Fig. 3 and represents
a market with K = 1 class of derivatives.
u v w
a1 a2
Figure 3: Path D
The associated r.v.s Xa1 and Xa2 are distributed i.i.d. by the continuous uniform distributionU({−1,1}). The vertex u has no expected counterparty risk at all, as E(max[−∣Xa1 ∣; 0]) =
E(0) = 0. The end-vertex w of D obviously entails E(max[∣Xa2 ∣; 0]) = E(∣Xa2 ∣) = 12 expected
counterparty credit risk. The c.f. of the sum Y ∶= ∣Xa1 ∣ − ∣Xa2 ∣ equals φU(0,1)(t)φU(−1,0)(t) =(1−e−it)(−1+eit)
t2
and its Hilbert transform H{φY } is 2(t−sin(t))t2 . Taking the limit limt→0 H{φY }(t)
and applying formulas (2.3) to (2.5) we obtain E (max[Y ; 0]) = ∂tφmax[Y ;0](0)i = 16 . Please
note that E (max[∣Xa1 ∣ − ∣Xa2 ∣; 0]) ≠ E (max[∣Xa1 ∣; 0]) +E (max[−∣Xa2 ∣; 0]). Economically, this
inequality means that a breakdown of the credit exposure of one participant into smaller pieces
is only possible by respecting the netting rules. Here, the multilateral netting rules are not
respected by splitting up the sum ∣Xa1 ∣ − ∣Xa2 ∣.
In addition, the example demonstates that the more liabilities a counterpart v has relative
to its claims, the lower the counterparty credit risk will be for v. Considering the netting
efficiency of a single counterparty the situation changes: the better the balance between claims
and liabilities, the greater the offsetting effect of the netting opportunity. In anticipation of
u v
w
Figure 4: Exposure circle
section 4.2, a popular example for the netting efficiency of a centrally cleared market is shown
in Fig. 4. Let us assume that each arrow of the exposure circle represents an exposure of 100e
million. Then, the circle of exposure implies a perfect balance between the claims and liabilities
of each participant, because the in- and outgoing arrows offset each other completely. If we
generalise this obvious concept of exposure circles and use the language of graph theory we come
across Eulerian digraphs. If we further replace the deterministic values by r.v.s that represent
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the future counterparty credit risk between two participants, then we come to Theorem 3.2.
To be able to do so, however, we need to introduce the degree γ(v) of a vertex v ∈ V within a
graph Gk = (V,Ek), which is the number ∣E(v)∣ of different edges at v. Let us now consider a
digraph Dk = (V,Ak). The in-degree of a single vertex v, denoted by γ+(v), is then the number
of arrows a ∈ Ak with h(a) = v. Similarly, we call the number of arrows a ∈ Ak with t(a) = v the
out-degree of v and denote it by γ−(v). We shall call γ+ ∶ v ↦ γ+(v) the in-degree function and
γ− ∶ v ↦ γ−(v) the out-degree function. Moreover, we define γ(v) ∶= γ+(v)− γ−(v) for a digraph
Dk and call γ the Eulerian degree function and γ(v) the Eulerian degree of v.
3.2 Theorem: Let Dk = (V,Ak) be a connected digraph with X ∼ ±∣P ∣ and a netting set Λv
with v ∈ V . Then the following holds:
(i) E(∑λ∈Λv ±∣Xλ∣) = 0 if and only if γ(v) = 0;
(ii) E(max[∑λ∈Λv ±∣Xλ∣; 0]) = 12∂t[H{φY }](0) if γ(v) = 0.
Proof. See section 7.1.
A graph is called Eulerian if each vertex of that graph has an even degree. A digraph is called
Eulerian if the in-degree equals the out-degree for each vertex v of that digraph, i.e., if γ(v) = 0
for each vertex v ∈ V .
We have shown in the last theorem that a vertex v ∈ V of a digraph with γ(v) = 0 is dis-
tinguished in the context of counterparty credit risk. Because of the definition of an Eulerian
digraph Dk = (V,Ak) the equation γ(v) = 0 is valid for every vertex v ∈ V . That is, netting
efficiency goes hand in hand with Eulerian digraphs in the context of so-called multilateral
netting rules21. For graphs we can state a similar result.
3.3 Theorem: Let Gk = (V,Ek) be a connected graph with X ∼ P and a netting set Λv with
v ∈ V . Then the following holds:
E
⎛⎝max⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣ ∑λ∈ΛvXλ; 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦⎞⎠ = 12∂t[H{φY (t)}](0).(3.1)
Proof. See section 7.2.
In contrast to digraphs, formula (3.1) of Theorem 3.3 is valid for any vertex of an arbitrary
graph. The reason for this mismatch is that the symmetry of the net r.v. Y = ∑λ∈Λv Xλ does
not depend on the netting set Λv. In the case of a graph, the r.v.s Xλ with λ ∈ Λv are symmetric
and so is Y .
Thus, using either a graph or a digraph to model a financial market does matter and should
be well-considered.
4 Application of the Network Model
In this section we define and explain measures for counterparty credit risk within an OTC and
a centrally cleared market. Afterwards, we are going to derive how to compute the expected
counterparty credit risk for both types of markets for a typical day in the future by applying
21Please refer to section 4.2 and especially to Example 4.6.
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the model introduced in section 2. For that purpose we clarify, in a first step, the outline of
both netting types. In a second step, we apply the notation X(k)v,w for a r.v. and x(k)v,w ∈ R for its
realisation as introduced in section 2.1.
To this end, we need to define the terms adjacent and neighbourhood. Two different vertices v
and w of a graph Gk = (V,Ek) are adjacent if {v,w} is an edge of Gk. In the case of a digraph
Dk = (V,Ak), the two vertices are adjacent if either (v,w) ∈ Ak or (w, v) ∈ Ak is valid. The
neighbourhood U ⊆ V of a vertex v in a graph Gk or a digraph Dk is the set of all vertices
adjacent to v.
4.1 Counterparty Risk within an OTC Market
Within an OTC market M we are allowed to offset positions across all kinds of derivatives
classes, but only between one single pair of counterparties. Thus, a bilateral netting set of
a given market participant v ∈ V will correspond to a bilateral portfolio of v and one of its
counterparts w ∈ UCv . Here, UCv is the neighbourhood of v across all classes of derivatives k ∈ C.
The real number x(k)v,w shall now represent the current observable position value of v relative to
w ∈ V ∖ {v} within derivatives class k. The deterministic function value yv,w(C) ∶= ∑k∈C x(k)v,w
is called the current bilateral position of v to w. Obviously, the function yv,w can be positive or
negative, and an immediate consequence of the definition is the validity of yv,w(C) = −yw,v(C),
meaning that the claims of the one are the liabilities of the other counterparty. Thus, the
actual current bilateral counterparty risk of v to w is max[yv,w(C); 0] and we call zb(D) ∶=∑v∈V ∑w∈UCv max[yv,w(C); 0] the current bilateral counterparty risk of D = (V, Â). This is a
reasonable bilateral counterparty risk measure of an arbitrary market M because it adds up
the netted exposure of all bilateral portfolios of M.
We now assume that the trade position that corresponds with an arrow of the digraph D =(V, Â) is not yet realised but represented abstractly by a r.v., i.e., X ∼ ±∣P ∣. For all other re-
lations between two different counterparts, we set the (future) position value deterministically
to zero. The direction of each arrow in each class k ∈ C determines whether the positive or the
negative absolute value of the associated r.v. is relevant for the calculation.
We shall call E (max[Yv,w(C); 0]) the expected bilateral counterparty risk of v to w, where
Yv,w(C) = ∑k∈C ±∣X(k)v,w∣ is now a conditional r.v. with mean and variance depending on the
information about the directions of the positions. In section 2.2 we have demonstrated how
to compute the expectation of such a random variable. Let φYv,w and φmax[Yv,w;0] be the c.f.s
of the r.v. Yv,w(C) and max[Yv,w(C); 0], respectively. If we apply formulas (2.2) to (2.5) we
obtain
E (max[Yv,w(C); 0]) = ∂t[φmax[Yv,w;0](t)](0)
i
.(4.1)
Putting the parts together and considering the possible asymmetry of the r.v.s of a digraph, as
described in section 3, we finally obtain the formula
E(Zb(D)) = ∑
v∈V ∑w∈UCv E (max[Yv,w(C); 0]) = ∑v∈V ∑w∈UCv
∂t[φmax[Yv,w;0](t)](0)
i
(4.2)
for the expected bilateral counterparty risk of an arbitrary digraph D.
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4.1 Example: Financial markets can be organised in different layers. In Germany, for instance,
Upper and Worms [UW04] describe a two-tier structure of the German interbank market.
The directed two-tier structure shown in Fig. 5 with X ∼ ±∣L(0,1)∣ is a digraph with N = 6
market participants and two classes of derivatives C = {1,2}, where the different classes are
depicted by different looking arrows. Calculating the expected bilateral counterparty risk for
v
v1 v2
w
w1 w2
Figure 5: Digraph with a directed two-tier structure and two classes of derivatives.
the digraph D = (V, Â) with Â = A1 ⊍A2 as depicted in Fig. 5 is straightforward, because all
bilateral portfolios have the same simple structure. There is only one claim and one debt within
each of the ten bilateral portfolios. For instance, Yv,w(C) = ∣X(1)v,w∣ − ∣X(2)v,w∣, whereby the r.v.s
on the right hand side of the last equation are distributed by the positve and negative absolute
value of the Laplace distribution. The associated c.f. φY of Yv,w(C) equals 11+t2 = ii+t −i−i+t and
applying formulas (2.3) to (2.5) we get φmax[Y ;0](t) = 12[1+ 11+t2 ]+ i2[H{ 11+t2 }(t)−H{ 11+t2 }(0)] =
2i+t
2i+2t , where H{ 11+t2 }(t) = t1+t2 .22 Thus, E(max[Yv,w(C); 0]) = ∂t[ 2i+t2i+2t ](0)i = 12 is the expected
counterparty risk for v relative to w. Because of formula (4.2) and the similarity of the bilateral
portfolios, we obtain E(Zb(D)) = 102 = 5.
Obviously, if we leave out the information about the direction of the r.v.s and if we further
consider the symmetry of the r.v.s of a graph we will receive a similar formula for the underlying
graph GD of D. The next example will demonstrate this obvious result.
4.2 Example: Consider the graph G ∶= ({v,w}, Ê) with N = 2, X ∼ N (0, σ) and Ê =
E1 ⊍ . . . ⊍ EK as sketched in Fig 6, where the different looking edges represent the netted
positions between v and w within one of K derivatives classes.
We have assumed X(k)v,w ∼ N (0, σ) for all k ∈ C and we do not have any additional information
about the direction of the edges. The c.f. φYv,w(C)(t) = φYw,v(C)(t) = e− t2Kσ22 of the sum
Y ∶= Yv,w(C) = ∑k∈CX(k)v,w equals the even and real-valued c.f. of N (0,√Kσ). Because of
22Please note that the positive absolute value of the Laplace distribution is the exponential distribution.
The imaginary part of the c.f. of the exponential distribution equals the Hilbert transform of 1
1+t2
because of equation (5.8). An alternative way to derive the Hilbert transform of 1
1+t2 is to use
formula (5.1) or (5.2). In our case we get H{ 1
1+t2 }(ω) = 2iRes [ 1(1+t2)(ω−t) , i] + iRes [ 1(1+t2)(ω−t) , ω] =
i−ω2−1 + 1ω−i = ω1+ω2 and by turning ω to t we get the same result. Please refer to Example 4.6.
13
v w⋮
X1
X2
XK
Figure 6: Two-vertex graph G with K edges
equation (2.3) and H{φY }(0) = 0 we obtain
φmax[Y ;0](t) = 1
2
[1 + φY (t)] + i
2
[H{φY }(t) −H{φY }(0)]
= 1
2
+ e−t2Kσ22
2
+ iF ( t
√
Kσ√
2
)√
pi
where H{φY }(t) = 2√piF ( t√Kσ√2 ) and F(t) ∶= e−t2 ∫ t0 es2 ds is the so-called Dawson function23.
The expected bilateral counterparty risk of v to w is then given by
E(max[Y ; 0]) = ∂t[φmax[Y ;0]](0)
i
= ∂t [i
F( t√Kσ√
2
)√
pi
] (0)
i
= σ√K
2pi
.
Please also refer to formula (3.1). The expectation above can be generalised to a complete graph
with N > 2 market participants. Each market participant v would have (N − 1) counterparties
in each derivatives class k ∈ C. The expected counterparty risk of one market participant would
then be (N − 1)σ√K2pi , which matches formula (3) in [DZ11]. Please note the symmetry of the
bilateral portfolios and that this expectation comprises 2
N(N−1)
2 orientations for each of the K
derivatives classes.
4.3 Conclusion: Let D = (V, Â) be a connected digraph along with N ≥ 2 market participants,
K > 1 derivatives classes C = {1, . . . ,K} and X ∼ ±∣P ∣ that represents an OTC market. Then
the following holds:
(i) E[∑k∈C ±∣X(k)v,w∣] = E[Yv,w(C)] = 0 if and only if the subdigraph induced by {v,w} is
Eulerian;
(ii) E (max[Yv,w(C); 0]) = 12∂t[H{φYv,k(t)](0) if the subdigraph induced by {v,w} is Eu-
lerian.
The proof of this conclusion is obvious since the netting set of a bilateral market equals all
arrows between v and w. Then, we only have to apply Theorem 3.2.
23See 7.2.5 in [Olv+13].
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4.2 Counterparty Risk within a Centrally Cleared Market
By introducing a CCP we do not need to extend the preceding setting, because the network
contains enough information to calculate the counterparty credit risk of each single entity and
therefore of the entire network. That is, we imagine a CCP as an abstract entity which is not
part of the market participant’s network. We assume that a CCP clears exactly one class of
derivatives. Within a multilateral derivatives market M we are not allowed to offset positions
across different derivatives classes. But we can aggregate positions of all market participants
of one single class k ∈ C that is cleared by a CCP instead. Thus, a multilateral netting set
of a market participant v ∈ V equals the neighbourhood U (k)v of v within derivatives class k ∈ C.
We shall call yv,k(U (k)v ) ∶= ∑w∈U(k)v x(k)v,w ∈ R the current multilateral position of v within de-
rivatives class k. The function yv,k therefore represents the netted sum of the observable trade
positions of v relative to all adjacent vertices within class k, but the actual current multilateral
counterparty risk of v to the CCP is max[yv,k(U (k)v ); 0].
If we change the perspective to the overall counterparty risk of the entire market, we get
zm(Dk) ∶= ∑v∈V ∣yv,k(U (k)v )∣ the current multilateral counterparty risk of Dk. The equation∑v∈V yv,k(U (k)v ) = 0 is valid since each position is counted twice in zm(Dk), once as debt and
once as claim. Therefore, we receive
zm(Dk) = ∑
v∈V ∣yv,k(U (k)v )∣ = 2 ⋅ ∑v∈V max[yv,k(U (k)v ); 0].
The last equation justifies the novation of the original bilateral contract to a CCP. We further
assume that bilateral netting is the prevailing form of netting, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
Therefore, if we introduce a CCP in one of the K classes of derivatives, let us say in the class
k ∈ C, then we assume that the remaining (K − 1) classes are still cleared bilaterally. Thus the
total exposure of the entire market is
zm(D) ∶= zm(Dk) + zb(D ∖Dk),(4.3)
where the last summand of the right-hand side of the equation denotes the current bilateral
counterparty risk of the OTC market D ∖Dk ∶= (V, Â ∖Ak).
Let us now suppose that the position values of M that corresponds to arrows of the digraph
D = (V,A) are not yet realised but represented abstractly by X ∼ ±∣P ∣. For all other relations
between two different counterparts, we set the (future) position value deterministically to zero.
The direction of each arrow of Ak determines the condition ± of the r.v.s ±∣X(k)v,w∣ distributed
by ±∣P ∣. Further, we denote the c.f. of the r.v. Yv,k(U (k)v ) and max[Yv,k(U (k)v ); 0] by φYv
and φmax[Yv ;0], respectively. If we apply again formulas (2.2) to (2.5) the expected multilateral
counterparty risk of of an arbitrary market participant v of Dk is then determined by
E (max[Yv,k(U (k)v ); 0]) = ∂t[φmax[Yv ;0](t)](0)i ,(4.4)
where Yv,k(U (k)v ) = ∑w∈U(k)v ±∣X(k)v,w∣ is a r.v. with mean and variance depending on the in-
formation about the directions of the positions. Putting the parts together, we obtain the
formula
E(Zm(Dk)) = ∑
v∈V E (max[Yv,k(U (k)v ); 0]) = ∑v∈V ∂t[φmax[Yv ;0](t)](0)i(4.5)
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for the expected multilateral counterparty risk of an arbitrary digraph Dk (of derivatives class
k). We adopt formula (4.3) to get
Zm(D) ∶= Zm(Dk) +Zb(D ∖Dk)(4.6)
for digraphs, where the weights of the arrows depend on random variables.
Again, if we fade the information about the direction of each r.v. out, we will obtain similar
formulas like (4.4) and (4.5) for an undirected underlying graph Gk of Dk. As in Example 4.2,
we derive a formula for a complete undirected graph with X ∼ N (0, σ).
4.4 Example: Suppose G = (V,E) is the undirected complete graph with N vertices, one
class of derivatives and X ∼ N (0, σ). We do not have any information about the direction of
the positions. For the sake of simplicity we write Yv instead of Yv,1 = ∑w∈U(k)v X(1)v,w and Xv,w
instead of X(1)v,w. The c.f. of the sum Yv(U (k)v ) = ∑w∈U(k)v Xv,w equals the even function φYv(t) =
e
−t2
2
(N−1)σ2 and its Hilbert transform equals the odd function H{φYv}(t) = 2√piF ( t√N−1σ√2 ).
Applying formulas (3.1) and (4.4), we obtain
E (max[Yv(U (k)v ); 0]) = 1i ∂t
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1
2
(1 + e−t22 (N−1)σ2) + iF ( t
√
N−1σ√
2
)√
pi
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (0) =
√
N − 1
2pi
σ
the expected multilateral counterparty risk of v within a complete graph with N vertices.
The last equation equals formula (4) in [DZ11]. Be aware of the symmetry of the multilateral
portfolios and that G is the underlying graph of 2
N(N−1)
2 different digraphs and the calculated
expected counterparty risk is some sort of average of all of them.
Applying Theorem 3.2 to a centrally cleared market we get the following conclusion.
4.5 Conclusion: Let D = (V, Â) be a connected digraph along with N ≥ 2 market participants,
K derivatives classes C = {1, . . . ,K} and X ∼ ±∣P ∣ that represents a centrally cleared market.
Then the following holds:
(i) E[∑
w∈U(k)v ±∣X(k)v,w∣] = E[Yv,k(Ukv )] = 0 if and only if γ(v) = 0 within class k;
(ii) E (max[Yv,k(U (k)v ); 0]) = 12∂t[H{φYv,k(t)](0) if γ(v) = 0 within class k.
4.6 Example: Suppose G = (V,E = {e1, e2, e3}) is the undirected graph as depicted in Fig. 7
with a single class of derivatives and X ∼ L(0,1). Let l,m,n ∈ {1,2,3} with m ≠ n.
We consider the Eulerian orientation D = (V,{a1, a2, a3}) as sketched in Fig. 7, which is
one out of eight possible orientations of G as depicted in Fig. 8. The orientations define the
directions of the edges and therefore the direction of the corresponding trade positions. The
c.f. 1
1+t2 = ii+t −i−i+t of the netted sum Yvl ∶= ∣Xm∣− ∣Xn∣ is real-valued and even. Here, Xm and Xn
are r.v.s that represent the corresponding positions. Applying (ii) of Conclusion 4.5 we obtain
E (max[Yvl(U (1)vl ); 0]) = 12∂t[H{φYvl}(t)](0) = 12∂t [ t1 + t2 ] (0) = 12
16
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Figure 7: Graph G and an Eulerian orientation D
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Figure 8: All 8 = 23 possible orientations of G
the expected multilateral counterparty risk of vl with l ∈ {1,2,3} of the Eulerian orientation D.
The expectation of the centrally cleared market is therefore given by E(Zm(D)) = E(Zm(D1)) =∑3l=1E (max[Yvl(U (1)vl ); 0]) = 3 ⋅ 12 = 32 . All other six non-Eulerian orientations entail 52 as ex-
pected counterparty risk of the entire market, which is significantly more than the risk of the
two Eulerian orientations.
Let us now turn our attention back to the undirected graph G = (V,E). The c.f. of a position
equals the real-valued and even function 1
1+t2 . The positive absolute value of 11+t2 is an analytic
signal, because 1
1+t2 as well as its Fourier transform is an absolute integrable function.24 Thus,
the imaginary part of 1
1+t2 + i t1+t2 is the Hilbert transform of 11+t2 .
The c.f. φYvl (t) = 1(1+t2)2 = 11+t2 11+t2 of the r.v. Yvl ∶=Xm +Xn of participant vl is also even and
real-valued. Its Hilbert transform H{φYvl}(t) for all l ∈ {1,2,3} is given by t(3+t2)2(1+t2)2 . Applying
formula (3.1) we obtain
E (max[Yvl,1(U (1)vl ); 0]) = 12∂t [ t(3 + t2)2(1 + t2)2 ] (0) = 34
for one of the three vertices of G, so E(Zm(G)) = 94 . This result can also be deduced as an
average of all orientations, that is, 18(2 ⋅ 32 + 6 ⋅ 52) = 94 .
The last example has shown that information about the direction of positions is essential for
the computation of the expectation of an entire market. Disregarding such information could
lead to over- or underestimating counterparty credit risk. It is obvious that similar result can
be obtained in more complex networks and that the precise structure is essential for the study
of counterparty and therefore systemic risk.
24Please refer to section 5.2.
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4.3 Advantageousness of Multilateral Netting
The objective of this section is to generalise a main result of Duffie and Zhu [DZ11]. The
authors raised the question of whether it is more advantageous for the overall counterparty
credit risk to clear via a CCP or classically bilateral between the two involved counterparties.
By applying the introduced network model we can answer this question not only for complete
graphs, but also for arbitrary graphs and digraphs. Moreover, the network model introduced
in section 2 is not constrained to the normal distribution, it can also employ any (symmetric)
distribution with a defined expected value.
Introducing a CCP for a single class of derivatives k ∈ C within a digraph D with K ∈ N classes
of derivatives along with X ∼ ±∣P ∣ improves the netting efficiency if and only if
E(Zm(D)) = E(Zm(Dk)) +E(Zb(D ∖Dk)) < E(Zb(D))
due to definition (4.6). Because of formulas (4.2) and (4.5) this applies if and only if
∑
v∈V
∂t[N−1φv,k(t)](0)
i
+ ∑
v∈V ∑w∈UCv ∂t[K−1φv,w(t)](0)i < ∑v∈V ∑w∈UCv ∂t[Kφv,w(t)](0)i ,(4.7)
where
Mφv,⋅(t) ∶= 1
2
[1 + φX(t)M ] + i
2
[H{φX(t)M}(t) −H{φX(t)M}(0)]
is the c.f. of the r.v. max[Y,0] with Y ∶= ∑Mj=1 ±∣Xj ∣ and Xj ∼ P . In this section M ∈ N is a
representative for N −1, K or K−1 and we write X instead of Xj . We are now able to compute
the advantageousness for a specific digraph by applying the introduced stochastic framework
to the inequality (4.7).
Let us now focus on a single representative counterpart v of a complete undirected graph with
X ∼ P as in [DZ11]. Because of the features of a complete graph as well as the equations (4.1)
and (4.4) it is then profitable for v to be cleared via a CCP if and only if
∂t[N−1φv,k(t)](0)
i
+ (N − 1)∂t[K−1φv,w(t)](0)
i
< (N − 1)∂t[Kφv,w(t)](0)
i
(4.8) ⇔ (N − 1)(∂t[Kφv,w(t)](0) − ∂t[K−1φv,w(t)](0)) > ∂t[N−1φv,K(t)](0).(4.9)
If we apply formula (3.1) and then put the result into (4.8) we will receive the inequality
1
2
∂t[H{φX(t)N−1}](0) < (N − 1)
2
[∂t[H{φX(t)K}](0) − ∂t[H{φX(t)K−1}](0)](4.10)
for a complete graph where the positions are distributed by P .
4.7 Example: Suppose we have a complete graph G = (V,E) with N market participants, a
single class of derivatives and along with X ∼ N (0,1). Applying formula (4.10) and considering
∂tH{φX(t)M}(0) = √M√ 2pi we obtain
1
2
√
N − 1√ 2
pi
< (N − 1)
2
⎛⎝√K
√
2
pi
−√K − 1√ 2
pi
⎞⎠ .
This inequality can be easily transformed to K < N24(N−1) with N > 2, which equals formula (6)
in [DZ11].
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The Laplace distribution has plainly fatter tails than the normal distribution. However, the
results of the next example are very similar compared to these of Example 4.7.
4.8 Example: Again, we consider a complete graph G = (V,E) along with X ∼ L(0,1). The
c.f. φX(t) equals 11+t2 . Unfortunately, in this case we can not solve the inequality induced by
formula (4.10) exactly. Instead, we apply formula (3.1) in order to obtain
1
i
∂t[Mφv,⋅(t)](0) = 1
2
∂t[H{φX(t)M}](0) = Γ(12 +M)√
piΓ(M) = M22M (2MM )(4.11)
the expected multilateral counterparty risk for the representative counterpart v within derivat-
ives class k. Here, Γ(t) ∶= ∫ ∞0 xt−1e−x dx is the so-called gamma function, which is an extension
of the factorial function.25 By applying formula (4.8) and (4.11) we can deduce the values of
K = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
N ≥ 2 6 10 14 18 22 26 30 34 38
Table 1: How many market participants do we need to assure the advantageousness of the
central clearing?
Tab. 1, where the solution set of N for a given K is listed. For instance, if we have K = 5
classes of derivatives, we will need at least N = 18 market participants in order to ensure the
advantageousness of the central clearing under the presuppositions made.
We have confirmed formula (6) of [DZ11], and we have also shown how to apply the introduced
model to do a similar calculation for a different distribution within a complete graph. However,
if we want to study the exact constitution of a financial market we need to study an arbitrary
graph or digraph and not a specific type of graphs or digraphs. As a result something as a
single representative counterpart for the entire structure can in general not exist. However, we
can compare the implications made from the different models in order to validate the associate
assumptions.
4.9 Example: Let GD be the underlying graph GD of Example 4.1. That is, we consider an
undirected two-tier market structure with X ∼ L(0,1). On the one hand, the expected bilateral
counterparty risk E(Zb(GD)) = 7.5 is significantly smaller than the expected multilateral coun-
terparty risk E(Zm(GD)) = 8.875. Compared, on the other hand, with the implications drawn
in Example 4.8, Tab. 1 for a complete graph with K = 2 classes of derivatives, we obviously
see that the risk profile of the described two-tier market with N = 6 participants is completely
different.
The last example demonstrates that the exact market structure is essential for giving a com-
prehensive answer to the raised question.
25The result of Example 4.6 can now be recalculated with formula (4.11). Just set M = N − 1 = 2 and
we get 1
i
∂t[2φv,k(t)] = 3√pi4√pi = 34 .
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5 Auxiliary Results for the Application
In this section we provide auxiliary results that can help to clear hurdles related to the applic-
ation of the network model presented in section 2. To the extent of our knowledge, Proposition
5.1 about Hilbert transforms is not yet known.26 The essence of Proposition 5.3 is known from
signal processing, but it has not yet been applied in the context of counterparty or systemic
risk.
5.1 Taking the Maximum and the Hilbert Transform
In order to tackle the problem of deriving the Hilbert transform we generalise the result in
section 3.4 in [Kin09a]. We show how to derive two very useful formulas by using complex
analysis and the well-known residue theorem.
In order to take the maximum max[Y ; 0] between the sum Y = ∑λ∈Λv ±∣Xλ∣ and zero, we have
to deal with the Hilbert transform as introduced in (2.4). Let φY be a real-valued function,
and let the function C ∋ z ↦ φY (z)ω−z be extended into the complex plane and bounded by C.
This extended function is required to be analytic within the complex upper half-plane, except
for a finite number of poles a1, . . . , am ∈ C of order n1, . . . , nm ∈ N. Further we assume that
φY (z)→ 0 as ∣z∣→∞.
5.1 Proposition: If the previously stated prerequisites are met then the equations
H{φY (t)}(ω) = 2i m∑
j=1Res [φY (z)ω − z , aj] + iRes [φY (z)ω − z ,ω] .(5.1)
and
H{φY (t)}(ω) = 2i m∑
j=1( 1(nj − 1)! limz→aj ∂
nj−1
∂znj−1 [(z − aj)nj φY (z)ω − z ]) − i limz→ωφY (z)(5.2)
are valid.
Proof. The interval ] − R,R[, as part of the domain of the Hilbert transform (2.4), is incor-
porated into the closed path C = CR ⊍ ] −R,ω − [ ⊍ C ⊍ ]ω + ,R[ as sketched in Fig. 9.
Obviously, we have R,  ∈]0,∞[. The positively oriented contour C consists of the semicircle
CR, the semicircle C and the segments on the real line.
The real-valued integrand is then extended into the complex region bounded by C and φY (z)ω−z
is required to be analytic27 within the complex upper half-plane, except for a finite number of
poles a1, . . . , am ∈ C of order n1, . . . , nm ∈ N. Furthermore, we assume that φY (z)→ 0 as z →∞
and we obviously have a simple pole on the real line at t = ω. We can choose R large and 
small enough such that the poles of φY of the upper half-plane lie within the contour C and
do not intersect with the semicircle C. Applying the residue theorem we get
∮
C
φY (z)
ω − z dz = 2pii m∑j=1Res [φY (z)ω − z , aj].(5.3)
26For a situation where poles inside the contour do show up please refer to section 22.10 in [Kin09b].
27See Chapter 1, Holomorphic Functions in [Rem91].
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RiR
t = ω
a3
a2
a1
am
am−1
. . .
CR
C
−R R
Figure 9: Contour C and the poles of φY (t) and 1ω−t
This contour integral can be decomposed into
∮
C
φY (z)
ω − z dz = ∫ ω−−R φY (t)ω − t dt + ∮C φY (z)ω − z dz + ∫ Rω+ φY (t)ω − t dt + ∮CR φY (z)ω − z dz.(5.4)
The first and third integral on the right hand side of equation (5.4) equals the principle value
integral as R →∞ and → 0, i.e.,
PV ∫ ∞−∞ φY (t)ω − t dt = limR→∞ lim→0 (∫ ω−−R φY (t)ω − t dt + ∫ Rω+ φY (t)ω − t dt) .
Let C be parameterised by ω + eiθ with −pi ≤ θ ≤ 0, then we obtain
∮
C
φY (z)
ω − z dz = lim→0 (i∫ 0−pi φY (ω + eiθ)eiθω − (ω + eiθ) dθ) = piiφY (ω) = −piiRes [φY (z)ω − z ,ω] .
For the last integral we parameterise CR by Reiθ with 0 ≤ θ ≤ pi and we bear in mind that
φY (z)→ 0 as ∣z∣→∞. We then deduce
∮
CR
φY (z)
ω − z dz = limR→∞(i∫ pi0 φY (Reiθ)Reiθω −Reiθ dθ) = 0.
Equation (5.3) therefore simplifies to
PV ∫ ∞−∞ φY (t)ω − t dt = 2pii m∑j=1Res [φY (z)ω − z , aj] + piiRes [φY (z)ω − z ,ω] ,
which leads to
H{φY (t)}(ω) = 2i m∑
j=1Res [φY (z)ω − z , aj] + iRes [φY (z)ω − z ,ω] .
If we then apply rule 1) and 2) of chapter 13 in [Rem91] we further receive formula (5.2).
The two equations (5.1) and (5.2) are particularly useful for calculating the Hilbert transform
of intricate functions as we can see in the next example.
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5.2 Example: Let φ∣X ∣(t) = 11−2it = 11+4t2 + 2it1+4t2 be the c.f. of a r.v. ∣X ∣ that is distributed by
the Gamma distribution Γ(α,β) with α ∶= 1 and β ∶= 2. Here α > 0 is the shape parameter and
β > 0 the scale parameter. Be aware that the Gamma distribution has only positive samples
and that the function φ∣X ∣(z) converges towards zero if ∣z∣ → ∞. Furthermore, the function
φ∣X∣(z)
ω−z is analytic in the upper half-plane except for the pole − i2 . Applying equation (5.1) we
get H{φ∣X ∣(t)}(ω) = iRes [φ∣X∣(z)ω−z , ω] = 2ω1+4ω2 − i 11+4ω2 .
Let us now consider the associated negative absolute value −(∣X ∣) = −∣X ∣ with φ−∣X ∣(t) =
1
1+4t2 − 2it1+4t2 . We now have i2 as simple pole. Applying again equation (5.1), we receive
H{φ−∣X ∣(t)}(ω) = 2iRes [φ−∣X∣(z)ω−z , i2] + iRes [φ−∣X∣(z)ω−z , ω] = 2ω1+4ω2 + i 11+4ω2 .
If we consider the last example carefully, we will find several interesting connections between
the positive and the negative absolute value as well as to its Hilbert transforms. We will
examine these connections in the next section. The introduced notation of this section shall be
valid for the entire article.
5.2 Positive and Negative Absolute Values
Let X ∼ P be a r.v. that is symmetric around the origin and φX its characteristic function. In
this section we study the connection between the c.f.s φX , φ∣X ∣ and φ−∣X ∣. The latter two c.f.s
are used for the representation of the direction of an arrow of the digraph D.
It is well-known that a c.f. φX of a r.v. X is Hermitian, i.e., that φX(−t) = φX(t) for all
t ∈ R. Due to Theorem 3.1.2 in [Luk70] the r.v. X is symmetric if and only if its c.f. φX is
real-valued and even. However, the c.f.s of the positive absolute value ∣X ∣ as well as of the
negative absolute value −∣X ∣ are in general complex-valued. We need to take into account the
equation −(∣X ∣) = −∣X ∣ as well as that φX is Hermitian in order to receive
φ∣X ∣(t) = η(t) + iν(t)(5.5)
for the positive absolute and
φ−∣X ∣(t) = η(t) − iν(t)(5.6)
for the negative absolute value for all t ∈ R. Please note that η = Re(φ∣X ∣), ν = Im(φ∣X ∣) and
that φ∣X ∣ = φ−∣X ∣ is obviously valid. In the following we explain how the functions η and ν are
connected to each other. We call any complex c.f. φ(t) whose real and imaginary components
satisfy the equation
φ(t) = η(t) + iν(t) = η(t) + iH{η}(t) t ∈ R(5.7)
an analytic signal28.
5.3 Proposition: The c.f. φ∣X ∣ of a positive absolute value ∣X ∣ with X ∼ P is an analytic signal
in a natural way29, i.e.,
φ∣X ∣(t) = φX(t) + iH{φX}(t).(5.8)
28See section 4.1.4 in [Kin09a].
29Compare with section 18.4 in [Kin09b].
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Proof. Let X be a symmetric r.v. with real-valued and even c.f. φX and let us further assume
that φX is absolutely integrable. Then, if its Fourier transform30 f ∶= F{φX} is also absolutely
integrable, we can use the inverse Fourier transform
F−1{f}(t) = 1
2pi
∫ ∞−∞ f(x)eixt dx = φX(t)(5.9)
to recover the input function φX from its Fourier transform. We can imagine f as a density
function that represents the distribution P . The definition of ∣X ∣ basically means that all
negative samples are rejected and the probability for the positive samples is doubled. Thus, we
set f+(x) ∶= f(x) + sgn(x)f(x) for all x ∈ R, where
sgn(x) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1, for x > 0
0, for x = 0−1, for x < 0
is the signum function. The function f+ is zero for all negative and 2f(t) for all positive real
numbers. Apparently, the function f+ is a representation for the positive absolute value ∣X ∣.
Applying the inverse Fourier transform to f+ we get
F−1{f+} = F−1{f} +F−1{sgn ⋅ f} = φX +F−1{sgn ⋅ f} = φ∣X ∣
because of formula (5.9) and the additivity of the integral. Due to equation (5.5) we further
know that F−1{f+} = η+ iν. Comparison of real and imaginary parts yields to F−1(sgn ⋅f) = iν,
which means that −i ⋅ sgn ⋅ f is related to ν by the inverse Fourier transform. According to
equation (5.2) in [Kin09a] the inverse Fourier transform of −i ⋅ sgn(x) equals 1pix and because of
(4.154) in [Kin09a] we receive
ν(t) = φX(x) ∗ 1
pix
= 1
pi
∫ ∞−∞ φX(t)x − t dx = H{φX}(t),
where ∗ is the convolution31. Putting the parts together to
φ∣X ∣(t) = φX(t) + iH{φX}(t),(5.10)
we easily infer that the c.f. φ∣X ∣ of the positive absolute value ∣X ∣ is an analytic signal. This
basically means that the negative samples of the real-valued distribution P are superfluous in
this context. An illustrative explanation for this fact provides the symmetry of the distribution
P .
Because of φ−∣X ∣(t) = φ∣X ∣(t) it follows
φ−∣X ∣(t) = φX(t) − iH{φX}(t).(5.11)
Furthermore, the n-th power of the Hilbert transform of the analytic signal φ∣X ∣ can be written
as
H{φn∣X ∣} = −iφn∣X ∣, n ∈ N,(5.12)
30See section 2.6.1 in [Kin09a].
31Section 2.6.2 in [Kin09a].
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due to equation (4.252) in [Kin09a].
Formulas (5.8) and (5.11) show how the c.f. of a symmetric distribution P and the c.f. of
its positive and negative absolute values are connected to each other by the Hilbert transform.
Both formulas are also useful when we employ a distribution with only positive or negative
outcomes as positive or negative absolute values32. We can then use formulas (5.8) and (5.11)
to get the Hilbert transform simply by considering the imaginary component of the positive or
negative absolute value of the distribution.
5.4 Example: We consider a netting set Λv comprising m ∈ N positive trade positions of a
counterparty v. Each position is represented by a i.i.d. r.v. ∣Xi∣ ∼ Γ(α,β) with i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,m}.
The absolutely integrable c.f. of the positive absolute value ∣Xi∣ is (1 − βit)−α and the sum
Y ∶= ∑mi=1 ∣Xi∣ is determined by the c.f. (1−βit)−αm. The sum Y is distributed by Γ(mα,β) and
its Hilbert transform equals −i(1 − βit)−αm, because of equation (5.12). Please also compare
these results to Example 5.2. It is quite straightforward to apply formula (2.5) to get the
expectation αβm of the credit exposure. The situation becomes more interesting, when the
netting set contains positive and negative trade positions of the counterparty v. Then, we have
to take the maximum between the sum of the r.v.s and zero in order to determine the expected
counterparty credit risk.
6 Conclusion
We endorse the view of several authors that considering the precise market structure for study-
ing counterparty credit risk or systemic risk is essential. We provide a new type of network
model which is capable of capturing the precise structure of any given financial market based,
for example, on empirical findings. With the attached stochastic framework it is further pos-
sible to study how a network structure and counterparty credit risk are connected to each other.
This allows us to study different structures and their characteristics relating to, for instance,
systemic risk. We show that Eulerian digraphs are distinguished exposure structures in the
context of counterparty risk and we reveal that different structures can have a significantly
different impact on the overall risk. We therefore suggest that the individual structure of a
financial market should be taken into consideration.
We use the powerful theory of characteristic functions as well as the theory of Hilbert trans-
forms. Deriving the specific characteristic function as well as its Hilbert transform can be a
great challenge. However, we provide useful insight into both concepts in order to overcome
these barriers in many cases. The model presented here is quite flexible and could be easily
modified to meet specific requirements. For example, it could be used to study the structure of
counterparty credit risk within other types of markets, different netting rules and more com-
plex distributions such as extreme value distributions. One could also use the model to study
analytically how shocks affect a specific network by changing the distribution (parameter) in
an appropriate way.
7 Proofs
This section contains the proofs of the two structure theorems.
32Please refer to Example 5.2.
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7.1 Proof of Structure Theorem 3.2
Assume Yv ∶= ∑λ∈Λv Xλ.
(i) Let λ ∈ Λv and let further Λ+v and Λ−v be the sets with h(λ) = v and t(λ) = v, respectively.
The two sets form a partition of Λv, that is, Λv = Λ+v ⊍Λ−v . Be aware that ∣Λ+v ∣ = γ+(v) and∣Λ−v ∣ = γ−(v). Keeping in mind the linearity of the conditional expectation, we deduce from
0 = E(Yv) = E (∑λ∈Λv ±∣Xλ∣) the equivalent equation 0 = ∑λ∈Λ+v E(∣Xλ∣)+∑λ′∈Λ−v E(−∣Xλ′ ∣).
Because each r.v. follows the same symmetric distribution around 0, we receive the
validity of 0 = ∣Λ+v ∣ ⋅E(∣Xλ∣)+ ∣Λ−v ∣ ⋅E(−∣Xλ′ ∣). The equation E(∣Xλ∣) = −E(−∣Xλ′ ∣) is valid
because of the symmetry of the r.v. and therefore we obtain 0 = [γ+(v)−γ−(v)] ⋅E(∣Xλ∣).
We conclude that γ(v) = 0, because E(∣Xλ∣) > 0. If we assume γ(v) = 0 we can use the
same arguments to show that the equation E(∑λ∈Λv ±∣Xλ∣) = 0 is valid.
(ii) The c.f. of max[∑λ∈Λv ±∣Xλ∣; 0] = max[Yv; 0] is given by (2.3). Applying formula (2.5) we
receive the corresponding expectation E (max[∑λ∈Λv ±∣Xλ∣; 0]) = 12E(Yv)+12∂t[H{φYv}(t)−
H{φYv}(0)](0). Because of (i) we have got E(Yv) = 0 if and only if γ(v) = 0. Let us
now assume that γ(v) = 0 then γ+(v) = ∣Λ+v ∣ = ∣Λ−v ∣ = γ−(v). According to equations (5.5)
and (5.6) the product φYv = (∏λ∈Λ+v φ∣Xλ∣) (∏λ′∈Λ−v φ−∣X′λ∣) must be real-valued and even.
The parity property33 of the Hilbert transform implies that H{φYv} is an odd continuous
function and therefore H{φYv}(0) = 0.
7.2 Proof of Structure Theorem 3.3
The c.f. φX of a r.v. X ∼ P is real-valued and even and so is the c.f. φY of the sum
Y ∶= ∑λ∈Λv Xλ. Because of the parity property the Hilbert transform H{φY (t)}(t) is a continu-
ous odd function. Since H{φY }(0) = 0, we obtain φmax[Y ;0](t) = 12 [1 + φY (t)]+ i2 [H{φY (t)}(t)]
and therefore the expectation can be calculated by ∂t[φmax[Y ;0](t)](0)i = 12i∂t[φY (t)](0) +
1
2∂t [H{φY (t)}(t)] (0).
The term ∂t[φY (t)](0)i stands for the expectation of the sum of ∣Λv ∣ i.i.d. random variables with
zero mean. Thus, ∂t[φY (t)](0)i = 0 and this leads us to the equation
E
⎛⎝max[ ∑λ∈ΛvXλ; 0]⎞⎠ = 12∂t[H{φY (t)}](0)
for an arbitrary vertex v ∈ V of the graph G.
33See (4.5) and (4.6) in [Kin09a].
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